

Cyber Security Services at TÜV Süd

(or why I left CERN&Physics
to do something completely
different)



Mehr Wert.
Mehr Vertrauen.

Add value.
Inspire trust.

Andreas Alexander Maier





At least 60 G€ damage in 2017

How many passwords do you have?

Service	Password of 99% of population	Effort with regular PC and GPU
[Service you signed up for as a child]	DadIsAnnoying1999	1ms – 1 day
Yahoo	DadIsAnnoying2004	%
Google Single Sign on	!D4d1s4nnoying13!	%
CERN	!D4d1s4nnoying13!CERN	%
Facebook	AnnoyingDadFB	%
Dropbox	!D4d1s4nnoying16!Drop	%

Attacks: Dictionary Attack (ms), Brute Force (days)

Have you been pwned? <https://haveibeenpwned.com/>

Hope you have many!

Service	Password of 99% of population	Effort with regular PC and GPU
[Service you signed up for as a child]	DadIsAnnoying1999	0 ms (pwned, but irrelevant)
Yahoo	DadIsAnnoying2004	< 1 ms (changing numbers doesn't help)
Google Single Sign on	!D4d1s4nnoying13!	< 1 ms (l33t speak doesn't help)
CERN	!D4d1s4nnoying13!CERN	< 1 ms (adding stuff doesn't help)
Facebook	AnnoyingDadFB	< 1 ms (removing stuff surely doesn't help)
Dropbox	!D4d1s4nnoying16!Drop	< 1 ms (see above)

■ Protection:

- One long random password per service, never reuse or alter! (e.g. l^j9AN_-#njaH6%AhD.<)
- Single sign on (let somebody else take care of the problem)
- Two (or three!) factor authentication (fingerprint, face, SMS, compagnon app)
- Pass phrase with unrelated words (e.g. CorrectHorseBatteryStaple)

Cyber Kill Chain



A : ADVANCED

Targeted, Coordinated, Purposeful

P : PERSISTENT

Month after Month, Year after Year

T : THREAT

Person(s) with intent, opportunity, and capability



- 7 Steps to describe a cyber attack
- Break it once and you are save
- Defender vs. Analyst vs. Attacker
 - Defender wants to break the chain
 - Defensive analyst wants to understand the chain and targets and preferred tactics of an attacking group
 - Attacker wants to stay secret

My time at MPP and CERN

“There’s so much interesting to learn!”

“There’s so much to do and understand and so little time!”

“I want to do A, B, C but I first have to finish other stuff”

2011-2012: ATLAS
Diploma student at MPI
in Richard Nisius’ group

2012-2016: ATLAS
PhD at MPI and CERN
in same group, quali task at CERN

2016 – 2018: CLIC / CMS
Postdoctoral fellow at
CERN

- **Data analysis**

- Top quark mass measurement




- **Data analysis**

- Top quark mass measurements
- **Phenomenology study**
 - Effects of full NLO calculation on $t\bar{t}$ observables
- **Detector construction**
 - IBL construction and pixel detector refurbishment




- **Data analysis**

- Triple gauge boson coupling, particle flow validation
- **Phenomenology study**
 - Parton shower effects on $t\bar{t}$ observables
- **Detector construction**
 - Sensor testing for the CMS HGCal project

A collection of memories



my contributions



What's out there?


So I started to write code...

- What I love(d)
 - Trust
 - Responsibility
 - Impact
 - Learning
 - Solving puzzles
 - Physics
 - i. Phenomenology
 - ii. Statistics
 - iii. Machine learning

- What I was good at
 - ATLAS data science in C++



A game (python)...fun but quite plain



A machine learning library (scala)...fun and challenging!

Possible jobs for me

- Data science
 - Various fields, e.g. automotive, energy
 - Machine learning
 - PhD position in Informatics
- Software development
 - Join a startup, e.g. crypto currency
 - Study computer science
- Analytics
 - High frequency trading
 - Portfolio optimization for banks
- Consulting
 - Tech consulting, e.g. Accenture
 - Management consulting, e.g. the big two and a hole lot of others

Cyber Kill Defense Chain



- Example scenario:
Customer “MPP Kantine” wants to ensure they’re safe
- Steps for Reconnaissance
 - Find out about their infrastructure (how many servers, webservice, etc)
 - Test infrastructure (remotely)
 - Correlate with other sources ((dark) web for info, known exploits)

Cyber Kill Defense Chain



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Cyber Kill Defense Chain



- Steps for action:
 - Give intermediate report to penetration testers (“hackers”) for attack
 - i. Remotely
 - ii. Social engineering
 - iii. Red teaming
 - Automate attacks as far as possible to let “pentesters” concentrate on the hard problems

Cyber Kill Defense Chain



Software Dev!
Machine learning!

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Cyber Kill Defense Chain



- Steps for delivery to customer
 - Compile all information for a report, including e.g.
 - i. Customer industry (consumer goods, maybe there's other hacks in the past?)
 - ii. Countries of exposure (maybe steaks from business partner in Austria?)
 - Compose vulnerability report and strategy for mitigation

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Cyber Security Lifecycle



Information Gathering

- Collect and understand requirements
- Assessment Framework Design
- Customer specific Profiles



Analytics & Correlation

- Automated analysis of gathered information
- Correlation and synch up check with other data (e.g. CVSS)
- Enrichment with relevant Add-On Information



Enhanced Info-based Assessment (ACV)

- Execution of defined Assessment based on valuable and relevant information
- Assessments under realistic conditions



Advisory

- Definition of actionable insights
- Support for implementation of countermeasures
- 3rd party solution evaluation



Contact info

- If you want to know more about data science, software development, or cyber security:
 - Good: andreas.maier@tuev-sued.de
 - Better: talk to me! Now!
 - Best: come visit us!
- More about TÜV Süd Cyber Security Services:
 - <https://www.tuev-sued.de/fokus-themen/it-security/cyber-security-check>
- More about me:
 - Stalk me: <https://www.linkedin.com/in/andreas-alexander-maier-769a78b9/>
 - Write code with me: <https://github.com/andb0t>

Thank you for your attention!

<p>UNCOMMON (NON-GIBBERISH) BASE WORD</p> <p>ORDER UNKNOWN</p> <p>Tr0ub4dor &3</p> <p>CAPS? COMMON SUBSTITUTIONS NUMERAL PUNCTUATION</p> <p>(YOU CAN ADD A FEW MORE BITS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE FACT THAT THIS IS ONLY ONE OF A FEW COMMON FORMATS.)</p>	<p>~28 BITS OF ENTROPY</p> <p>$2^{28} = 3 \text{ DAYS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$</p> <p>(PLAUSIBLE ATTACK ON A WEAK REMOTE WEB SERVICE. YES, CRACKING A STOLEN HASH IS FASTER, BUT IT'S NOT WHAT THE AVERAGE USER SHOULD WORRY ABOUT.)</p> <p>DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: EASY</p>	<p>WAS IT TROMBONE? NO, TROUBADOR. AND ONE OF THE 0s WAS A ZERO?</p> <p>AND THERE WAS SOME SYMBOL...</p> <p>DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: HARD</p>
<p>correct horse battery staple</p> <p>FOUR RANDOM COMMON WORDS</p>	<p>~44 BITS OF ENTROPY</p> <p>$2^{44} = 550 \text{ YEARS AT } 1000 \text{ GUESSES/SEC}$</p> <p>DIFFICULTY TO GUESS: HARD</p>	<p>THAT'S A BATTERY STAPLE.</p> <p>CORRECT!</p> <p>DIFFICULTY TO REMEMBER: YOU'VE ALREADY MEMORIZED IT</p>

THROUGH 20 YEARS OF EFFORT, WE'VE SUCCESSFULLY TRAINED EVERYONE TO USE PASSWORDS THAT ARE HARD FOR HUMANS TO REMEMBER, BUT EASY FOR COMPUTERS TO GUESS.